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REGULATORY APPROACHES TO
TELEVISION NETWORK CONTROL OF THE
PROGRAM PROCUREMENT PROCESS: AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
I. Introduction
On December 10, 1974, the United States Department of Justice
initiated separate civil antitrust suits under sections one and two of
the Sherman Act' against the three national television networks.2 In
substance, each complaint alleges that the networks have exercised
their control over broadcast time in such a way as to monopolize
prime-time3 television entertainment programming.' The com-
plaints further assert that the networks have improperly exercised
such control in order to exclude those entertainment programs in
which they acquire no financial or proprietary interests.' The net
effect of this practice, the government avers, has been to concen-
trate ownership and control of television programming in the net-
works, unreasonably restrain competitive practices in the television
industry, and deprive the viewing public of the benefits of free-
market competition.' Accordingly, the Justice Department is seek-
ing any relief which will dissipate the effects of the networks' activi-
ties and restore competitive conditions to the television entertain-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970 & Supp. IV 1976).
2. United States v. American Broadcasting Co., Civ. No. 74-3600 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec.
10,1974); United States v. National Broadcasting Co., Civ. No. 74-3601 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec.
10, 1974); United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., Civ. No. 74-3599 (C.D. Cal.,
filed Dec. 10, 1974).
3. Prime-time denotes the television network broadcast schedule between the hours of
7:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k)(1), (1978).
4. See Complaint at 7-8, United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., Civ. No.
74-3599 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 10, 1974) [hereinafter cited as CBS Complaint]. News, public
affairs, documentary and sport programs produced by the networks are not affected by the
suits, nor do the complaints challenge the affiliation agreements between the networks and
their local affiliated stations. [1979] 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,074, at 53,596-7 (State-
ment of Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper).
5. See CBS Complaint, supra note 4, at 8-9. All complaints additionally allege improper
network practices vis-a-vis television and non-television exhibition and distribution of theatr-
ical motion picture films. CBS and ABC are additionally charged with other offenses. Id. at
9. See also Complaint, United States v. American Broadcasting Co., Civil No. 74-3600 (C.D.
Cal., filed Dec. 10, 1974) [hereinafter cited as ABC Complaint].
6. See CBS Complaint, supra note 4, at 9.
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ment program industry.7 Regardless of its eventual resolution, the
present litigation will assuredly alter network structure and policy.
These civil actions duplicate, in part, a prior, decade-long inquiry
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) into network
program procurement practices.' Commenced in 1959, this FCC
study led to the promulgation of rules intended to regulate the pro-
Curement process.' Although these rules have curbed several evils
formerly associated with network power, commentators have argued
that their net effect has been to solidify the economic base of net-
work programming control. Presently, confronted with the Justice
Department suits, the FCC has re-examined its position with regard
to its current rules and has commenced a parallel inquiry of its
own." Thus, there exists a possibility that conflicting or duplicative
regulatory scherijes will result.
This Comment will discuss the network television program pro-
curement process and examine the current FCC and Justice Depart-
ment inquiries. From this comparison will emerge not only a critical
appraisal of network market power in the program procurement
process but also an evaluation of the problems inherent in overlap-
ping regulatory schemes. Part II will briefly sketch current televi-
sion programming practices and the program procurement process.
Part III will discuss the original FCC inquiry into programming
abuses and will offer some theories as to why the subsequently pro-
mulgated rules served only to concentrate network economic power
and exacerbate program procurement abuses. Part IV will review
the current Justice Department suits against the three national net-
works and discuss the networks' alleged Sherman Act violations.
Part V will assess the viability of the renewed FCC investigation
7. See, e.g., id. at 10-11.
8. See Competition and Responsibility in Network Broadcasting, Report and Order, 23
F.C.C.2d 382 (1970) thereinafter cited as Network Broadcasting] discussed in notes 65-81
infra and accompanying text. The television network program procurement process is dis-
cussed in notes 12-37 infra and accompanying text.
9. See text accompanying notes 85-95 infra.
10. See, e.g., Schuessler, FCC Regulation of the Network Television Program Procure-
ment Process: An Attempt to Regulate the Laws of Economics?, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 227, 299-
302 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Schuessler]; Note, 29 RUrGEs L. REV. 902, 912-14 (1976);
Crandall, The Economic Effect of Television-Network Program Ownership, 14 J.L. & ECON.
385, 408 (1971-1972) [hereinafter cited as Crandall].
11. See Commercial Television Network Practices, Notice and Inquiry, 62 F.C.C.2d 548
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Network Practices].
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into network practices in light of the pending litigation.
II. The Program Procurement Process
A television network is composed of independent licensees which
derive a substantial portion of their daily programming require-
ments from a centralized source, the network corporation.'2 The
network corporation obtains programs, secures sponsorship through
the sale of advertising time, and offers a continuous, coordinated
program schedule to its affiliates.' 3 This relationship affords the
network corporation the conditional right to sell its affiliates' air
time to advertisers and to supply programming and promotional
announcements which may be broadcast at the discretion of the
affiliate.' 4 In turn, the affiliate is compensated by the network cor-
poration for broadcasting such programming through its participa-
tion in network advertising revenues.' 5
The network corporation, in order to meet its programming obli-
gations to the affiliates, must ensure a continuous stream of enter-
tainment programs. The networks presently have three such sources
12. See Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 45 F.C.C. 2146, 2146 n.2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Proposed FCC
Rulemaking]. At present, three national television networks are engaged in commercial
broadcasting: The American Broadcasting Company (ABC), The National Broadcasting
Company (NBC), and the Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS). A fourth network,
DuMont, withdrew from the television market in the 1950's. Id.
13. See Network Practices, supra note 11, at 551. The corporation-affiliate system is
interconnected through facilities provided by the American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
as a common carrier, on the basis of tariff rates fixed by the FCC. See Proposed FCC
Rulemaking, supra note 12, at 2146 n.2.
14. Proposed FCC Rulemaking, supra note 12, at 2146 n.2. See also B. OWEN, J. BEEBE &
W. MANNING, TELEVISION ECONOMICS 97-101 (1974) [hereinafter cited as OWEN]; R. NOLL, M.
PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION, 60-63 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as NOLL & PECK].
15. See, e.g., Clancy, The Broadcasting Station and its Relationship with the Network,
reprinted in 72 PRACTISING LAW-INSTrruTE, LEGAL AND BUSINESS PROBLEMS OF TELEVISION AND
RADIO 11-39 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Clancy]. See also Bryant, Historical and Social
Aspects of Concentration of Program Control in Television, 34 L. & CONTEMP. PRoB. 610, 623
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Bryant]. A graphic representation of the television network
structure is set out in OWEN, supra note 14, at 7:
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of programming:"e advertisers, 7 the networks' own production facili-
ties,"5 and independent suppliers."
Advertiser-originated programs are characterized by the absence
of network participation in creative decision making. 0 In this in-
Money
and
Money
16. See generally FCC TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, H.R. REP. No. 281,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-74 (1963) [hereinafter cited as NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT].
See also Crandall, supra note 10, at 388-89.
17. Crandall, supra note 10, at 388-89.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 387-88. Strictly speaking, approval must be sought from the network which will
eventually broadcast the program. Advertisers must also adhere to network standards regard-
ing decency, taste, etc. Id.
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stance, only the advertiser and program producer participate in the
production process. The network sells broadcast time to the spon-
soring advertiser; a percentage of this revenue is remitted to the
affiliates.2' In the case of internally-produced network program-
ming, the network assumes all financial risks, exerts unilateral ar-
tistic control, and retains a substantially larger share of income
from the sale of commercial air time to sponsoring advertisers."
Despite these two sources, most television entertainment program-
ming is supplied by independent producers who act as joint ventur-
ers with the participating network.2 1
Joint participation ventures between network and independent
suppliers have traditionally been shrouded in secrecy. The initial
step is nearly always identical: someone approaches a network exec-
utive with a program idea. 4 The originator may be a major program
supplier or independent "packager;" 25 occasionally, the idea origi-
nates with a writer or director.26 Regardless of origin, a television
network may receive in excess of 1,800 program ideas from legiti-
mate outside sources within a calendar year." From these submis-
sions network executives select a very small percentage for subse-
quent development. 28 Program development usually involves a
21. See Clancy, supra note 15, at 11-39.
22. See Crandall, supra note 10, at 388.
23. Id.
24. W. PALEY, As IT HAPPENED 259 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PALEY]. Mr. Paley, a
revered figure in the broadcasting industry, served as Chairman of CBS during several de-
cades of unrivalled CBS market dominance.
25. The terms "producer" and "packager" are virtually synonymous in industry parlance.
Current major program suppliers include MCA-Universal Television, Warner Bros. Televi-
sion, and Paramount Television. Prominent independent "packagers" include Lorimar Pro-
ductions, Spelling-Goldberg Productions, T.A.T. Communications, and M.T.M. Enterprises.
PALEY, supra note 24, at 259-61.
26. Id. Granting contemporary cross-promotional savvy, ideas may originate with literary
agents, publishing executives, recording industry promoters, etc. The permutations are end-
less. It is not uncommon for a programming executive to originate an idea and then seek a
producer to develop it into submissible form. See generally FOSTER, UNDERSTANDING
BROADCASTING 240-43 (1978).
27. See PALEY, supra note 24, at 259-61. See also R. SHANKS, THE COOL FIRE 143 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as SHANKS].
28. For example, in 1971, 1,100 programming ideas were received at CBS. Of these sub-
missions, approximately fifty were selected for development into teleplays. Thompson, How
A Network Boss Picks Shows, LIFE, Sept. 10, 1971, at 46-50. In the course of the 1978-79
program season, CBS selected approximately 200 ideas for development. PALEY, supra note
24, at 259-61.
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"step deal" wherein a 'network enters into a series of conditional
commitments through which an idea evolves into a "treatment"' or
outline and, later, into successive drafts of a teleplay. 0 Occasion-
ally, a network may commit itself to the production of a program
or program series solely on the basis of a treatment or teleplay.3
More commonly, however, a network will refuse to enter into any
such commitment until one or more "pilot" programs" have been
produced.33 Thereafter, the pilot is often the subject of considerable
market research and analysis.34 Once the evaluation phase has been
completed, a network may exercise its irrevocable option to order a
series of programs based on the original program idea.35 Thus,
throughout the course of the development process, a network invests
substantial risk capital not only in financing those activities directly
related to the development of the program, but also by incurring a
host of ancillary expenses related to the network-supplier relation-
ship." The result of this approach is that the network retains crea-
tive control over all program elements.37
The present Justice Department and FCC investigations into this
network program procurement process reflect the notion that the
29. A treatment usually consists of a narrative outline of indeterminate length intended
to provide a basis for assessing the potential of an idea as a television or motion-picture
entertainment vehicle. See, e.g., R. LEE & R. MISIOROWSKI, SCRIpr MODELS (1978).
30. A teleplay is a script intended for television production. See generally C. TRAPNELL,
TELEPLAY (1974).
31. SHANKS, supra note 27, at 259-61.
32. A pilot program is a representative episode of a proposed television series produced
in order to assess the viability of the series concept. In recent years, it has become customary
to broadcast discarded pilots during a network's re-run summer schedule. See Flynn,
Acquisition of Programs for Broadcasting, reprinted in 72 PRAcTISINo LAW INSTrruTE, LEGAL
AND BUSINESS PROBLEMS OF TELEVISION AND RADIO 47 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Flynn].
Pilots for one-hour programs are produced with running times of ninety or 120 minutes, so
as to permit the networks to salvage their programming failures as "Movies of the Week" or
similar fare. Id.
33. See id. at 57 (Sample Network Contract (ABC)).
34. See PALEY, supra note 24, at 259-61. In 1971, CBS selected six of fifteen pilots for
production as television series. LIFE, Sept. 10, 1971, at 46-50.
35. See Flynn, supra note 32, at 52.
36. These may include a total or ratable segment of the producer's overhead costs, as well
as any reasonable fees incurred in the solicitation of program talent, and, occasionally, attor-
neys' fees and personal expenses related to program development. Flynn, supra note 32, at
51.
37. Id. at 52. Another result is that the network acquires a proprietary interest in the
program which later becomes a source of revenues to be recouped from network exhibition.
See Crandall, supra note 10, at 388-89; Bryant, supra note 15, at 388-89.
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networks, by virtue of their preferred position and exclusive access
to the limited broadcast frequencies, have coerced commitments
from independent program suppliers, which the networks would not
otherwise have been able to obtain under competitive market cir-
cumstances1 8 In addition, the networks are charged with foreclosing
television access to those program suppliers which have refused to
grant financial concessions."' The substance of these allegations is
as old as broadcasting itself, and relate back to the origins of televi-
sion broadcasting and the establishment of the FCC.
III. The Original FCC Inquiry and the Establishment
of the Program Procurement Rules
The Communications Act of 19340 grants the FCC the power to
regulate the radio, television and other communications indus-
tries." Although the FCC is accorded broad discretion in the exer-
cise of its regulatory mandate, its actions must always be prompted
by the "public interest, convenience or necessity."' 2 Formulation of
an effective FCC policy has often been impeded because of this
imprecise standard. 3 Yet, the FCC has consistently sought to foster
competition in the broadcast industries." Accordingly, in order to
restrain monopolistic tendencies already developing at the time of
the Communications Act's passage," the Act expressly provides
that the broadcast industry is subject to the antitrust laws. 6 In
United States v. Radio Corporation of America, 7 the Supreme
38. See, e.g., CBS Complaint, supra note 4, at 9.
39. Id. at 8.
40. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
41. Id. § 151. The telephone and telegraph industries are "common carriers" subject to
FCC jurisdiction. Id. §§ 201-222.
42. Id. § 309(a). A former FCC Commissioner had characterized the phrase as furnishing
the "battleground for broadcasting's regulatory debate." N. MINNOW, EQUAL TIME: THE PRI-
VATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 8 (1964). See also E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, THE
POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 15-17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as KRASNOW & LONGLEY].
43. KRASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 42, at 15.
44. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, NETWORK BROADCASTING, H.
R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 54 (1958) [hereinafter cited as NETWORK REPORT].
45. See W. EMERY, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT 42 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
EMERY]. See also FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1959).
46. 47 U.S.C. § 313 (1962). Section 313 additionally provides for the revocation of a
broadcaster's license subsequent to conviction on an antitrust charge. Id. Section 311 prohib-
its the FCC from granting subsequent license authorization to the convicted party. Id. § 311.
See also EMERY, supra note 45, at 42.
47. 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
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Court held that the Act allows the Justice Department to bring
independent civil or criminal antitrust actions even after an FCC
administrative resolution of the same matter."
In 1938, the FCC responded to a virtual absence of competition
among radio networks and their affiliates by promulgating the
Chain Broadcasting Rules.49 These rules struck at the restrictive
contractual relations between network broadcasters and their affili-
ates by forbidding practices such as network control over affiliate
station rates,'" exclusive affiliation of stations,5 territorial exclusiv-
ity,"2 and "option time."" The rules withstood challenge in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States," where the Supreme Court rec-
ognized the FCC's comprehensive mandate to remedy anti-
competitive practices in the communications industries.5"
Subsequent to the promulgation of the Chain Broadcasting Rules,
the television networks grew and developed in much the same way
as had the radio broadcasters. By 1955, the television industry was
characterized by a market structure in which independent suppliers
bargained directly with advertisers, as well as with the national
networks, for acquisition of programming fare." This structure grad-
ually deteriorated in the following decade.57 Several factors, most
notably the soaring cost of program production, 5 hastened this dete-
48. Id. at 346.
49. See 6 Fed. Reg. 2282, 5258 (1941) (current version at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(a),(b),(d),(h)
(1978)). The Communications Act of 1934 defines "Chain Broadcasting" as "simultaneous
broadcasting of an identical program by two or more connected stations." 47 U.S.C. § 15 3 (p)
(1976). The Chain Broadcasting Rules were made applicable to the television networks in 11
Fed. Reg. 33 (1946).
50. 6 Fed. Reg. 2282 (1941)'(current version at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(h) (1978)).
51. 6 Fed. Reg. 2282 (1941) (current version at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(a) (1978)).
52. 6 Fed. Reg. 2282 (1941) (current version at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(b) (1978)). The provi-
sion bars network-affiliate agreements that prevented networks from offering a network pro-
gram rejected by an affiliate to an independent station in the network affiliate's locality. Id.
53. 6 Fed. Reg. 5258 (1941) (current version at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(d) (1978)). The prohibi-
tion on option time prevents a network from irrevocably commiting an affiliate to accept
network programming on a given date by providing the affiliate with advance notice of the
program's air date. Id.
54. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
55. Id. at 222-24.
56. See Network Broadcasting, supra note 8, at 387.
57. Id. See also OWEN, supra note 14, at 19-21.
58. OWEN, supra note 14, at 19-21. For example, the cost of an hour-long program skyrock-
eted from $70,000 in 1956 to $110,000 in 1961. NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, supra note
16, at 256. One year after the Commission's rulemaking, the cost of a thirty-minute show was
[Vol. VIII
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rioration as advertisers abandoned single or dual program sponsor-
ship in favor of one-minute or thirty-second "participations" in pro-
gram sponsorship. 9 The resulting vacuum virtually guaranteed the
networks a position as the sole purchasers of programming and
prompted their involvement as joint venturers in the program pro-
duction field.6 0 This development, in turn, spurred the FCC to in-
vestigate abuses in the network-controlled program procurement
process." Following three years of exhaustive research and analysis,
the FCC's Office of Network Study submitted its findings. 2 The
report concluded that network practices "unduly restrict and re-
strain the competitive development of the market for independently
produced network television programs. '6 3 This statement reflected
the Commission's view that a massive and fundamental shift in the
internal economics of the television industry had occurred, a shift
which had transformed the television medium into a "nationwide
electronic medicine show, in which the pitchman gathers his crowd
with a little free entertainment, then gives his spiel for his cure-all
snake oil."6 4 Specifically, the Commission made several findings.
Between 1957 and 1968, the share of all programming produced
or controlled by the networks during the evening hours rose from
67.2 to 96.7 percent. 5 With regard to entertainment programming
alone, network produced or controlled evening programming rose
from 64.4 percent to 96.2 percent during the same period.6 In addi-
tion, the Commission discovered a developing pattern of increased
network participation in the subsequent syndication 7 of
independently-supplied entertainment programming. Between 1957
and 1968, network domestic syndication rights in independently-
estimated to be $200,000; a one-hour or ninety minute program was estimated to occassionally
exceed $750,000. LIFE, Sept. 10, 1971, at 53.
59. See Network Broadcasting, supra note 8, at 391. See also OWEN, supra note 14, at 20.
60. OWEN, supra note 14, at 19-20.
61. See 24 Fed. Reg. 1605 (1959).
62. NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, supra note 16, at 66-74.
63. See Network Broadcasting, supra note 8, at preface (Letter of Submittal from Ash-
brook P. Bryant, Chief of the Office of Network Study to the Commission (Nov. 28, 1962)).
64. NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, supra note 16, at 396 (Testimony of the Dean,
College of Journalism and Communications, University of Illinois).
65. See Network Broadcasting, supra note 8, at 389.
66. Id.
67. Syndication refers to the sale and distribution of programming on a station-by-station
basis. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1978).
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supplied programs increased from 15.9 to 23.8 percent;8 network
rights in foreign syndication rose from 23.3 to 24.4 percent." Simi-
larly, the percentage of prime-time entertainment programs in
which the networks acquired subsidiary rights and interests rose
markedly during the same period.7" These findings clearly supported
the Commission's hypothesis that "the three national networks, for
all practical purposes, control the entire network television program
procurement process from idea through network exhibition."'"
Previously, direct program sales to advertisers had benefitted pro-
ducers because advertisers seldom acquire syndication, profit-
sharing, or ancillary rights. These rights represent valuable com-
mercial assets which, in large measure, contribute to the commer-
cial viability of independent producers. Clearly, the shift from
advertiser to network creative and financial control resulted in the
transformation of a competitive market into an oligopsonistic mar-
ket favoring broadcasters. For example, in its report, the Commis-
sion listed fifteen independent suppliers which regularly provided
the networks with quality programming. In a competitive market
the programs supplied to the networks by these firms should com-
mand substantially better terms than those secured by "one-
season" producers. The converse was in fact true: regular suppliers
fared little better than their one-season counterparts.7" Moreover,
the networks exacted substantial syndication rights, profit-sharing,
and other financial participation from the established indepen-
dents. The situation was similar with regard to the major motion
picture studios. 8 In such instances, although the networks assumed
developmental financing for only seventeen of the twenty-seven se-
ries sold by the studios in 1964, syndication rights and profit shares
were acquired in all. The Commission noted that these rights were
68. See Network Broadcasting, supra note 8, at 392.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 393.
72. See Proposed FCC Rulemaking, supra note 12, at 2150.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2157.
75. See Network Broadcasting, supra note 8, at 388 n.14.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 388.
[Vol. VIII
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acquired without any assumption of financial risk by the networks."
Clearly, the considerable bargaining power of the studios was of
little consequence when compared with the networks' "gatekeeper"
status. The Commission remarked that: "A direct relationship ap-
pears to exist between new programs chosen for network schedules
and network acquisition of subsidiary rights and interests ...
[V]ery few programs are produced for network exhibition where the
network does not get some share in their subsequent earning power
through syndication and other rights."'"
To remedy this situation, the Commission's Second Interim Re-
port" recommended that the FCC curtail "the instance and fre-
quency of network control of programs through the acquisition of
licenses for network exhibition of the independently produced pro-
grams included in their schedules."" Acting on these and other
recommendations, the FCC proposed rules to govern the program
procurement process." The rules were adopted, with substantial
modification,u on May 4, 1970.86
The impact of the rules was to limit network access to affiliates
in the "top 50" markets 7 to three hours of network-broadcast pro-
gramming between eight o'clock and eleven o'clock in the evening.1
80. Id. The Commission noted in passing that
the data submitted by the networks ... confirms that no matter how producers are
categorized in terms of bargaining power, their entry to the prime-time network televi-
sion market is accompanied by the transfer of a substantial part of the potential
profitability of their products to the purchasers-the networks. The fact that, over the
years, the producers have perforce adjusted their methods of doing business and have
learned to live with this situation in no way changes the essentially oligopolistic nature
of the situation.
Network Broadcasting, supra note 8, at 388-89.
81: Id. at 393.
82. See NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, supra note 16, at 101.
83. Id.
84. See Proposed FCC Rulemaking, supra note 12.
85. The "modification" consisted of the Commission's non-adoption of the "50/50" rule
whereby networks would be prohibited from exhibiting network-produced programs in more
than fifty percent of their schedule. The rule was jettisoned after ABC (then the weakest
network) claimed that it would suffer disproportionate injury.
86. See Network Broadcasting, supra note 8, at 382.
87. See 47 C.F.R. §73.658(k)(n.1) (1978). The "Top 50" markets are established by the
Arbitron publication Television Market Analysis. Id.
88. See id. §73.658(k). Exceptions were granted for those programs whose duration is not
under strict network control (e.g., sports events), news programs of an unscheduled nature
(e.g., fast-breaking news events), and political broadcasts by legally qualified candidates for
public office. Id.
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This rule, eventually recognized as the Prime-Time Access Rule
(PTAR I), also provided for the exclusion of "off-network" program-
ming"' during the access hour. In addition, the Commission adopted
rules prohibiting the networks from distributing and sharing in the
profits of domestically syndicated programming. The Commission
also restricted network syndication activities in foreign markets to
those programs which were entirely network-produced.' Finally, the
networks were prohibited from "warehousing"'" television programs
which they had originally acquired for exhibition. 3 In its conclusion,
the FCC expressed its intention to reevaluate the rules on an ongo-
ing basis and amend them in response to the public interest.' This
approach was wholly consistent with the Commission's time-
honored policy of "modest change."'8
These FCC rules regarding the program procurement process were
contested by broadcasters in Mt. Mansfield Television v. FCC." A
number of television broadcasters, including the three national net-
works, brought suit claiming that PTAR I restrained freedom of
speech, that the FCC had overstepped its statutory authority in the
promulgation of the rule, and that insufficient notice had been ac-
corded the claimants prior to the rulemaking.7 Rejecting each of
these claims, the court concluded that rather than violating the first
amendment, the Prime-Time Access Rule appeared to be a reasona-
89. See id. "Off-network" programs are those programs which are sold or licensed for
exhibition subsequent to or contemporaneous with their original network run; local stations
often program them. "Star Trek," originally aired on NBC, is an example of a program that
has exhibited greater vitality in off-network syndication than it had during the course of its
original run.
90. See id. §73.658(j)(1)(ii).
91. Id. § 73.658(j)(2).
92. See id. §73.658(j)(1)(ii). "Warehousing" refers to the network practice of refusing to
exhibit a program in which it has acquired exhibition rights to the detriment of a producer
who may wish to re-acquire it for disposition on another network or medium. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Network Broadcasting, supra note 8, at 401. Chairmen Burch and Wells dissented
from the agency's action, citing the potential instability of a multiple-station market as a
deterrent to market entry by independent producers. Id. at 413.
95. Id. at 395. The policy is briefly sketched in KRASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 42, at
187. According to the authors, the FCC's "modest" approach has the virtue of being sensitive
to audience "feedback" and is capable of revision while implementing change not violative
of the ideological consensus. Id. at 188, 190. Its principal difficulty is its ability to deal with
immediate "bottlenecks" at the expense of failing to resolve long-term difficulties. Id. at 189.
96. 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971).
97. Id. at 479-81.
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ble step towards fulfilling that amendment's mandate of encourag-
ing program diversity and promoting contrasting sources of program
service." As to the second claim, the court stated that the FCC's
regulation of network program procurement was a proper exercise
of its ancillary powers to regulate broadcasting in light of the public
interest." Finally, the court noted that sufficient time had been
afforded claimants to comment on the rule and, in any event, no
statute required an agency to "publish in advance every precise
proposal which it may ultimately adopt as a rule."'0
On October 26, 1972, the FCC commenced an inquiry into the
viability of PTAR 1.101 This inquiry was prompted by allegations
that the rule had failed in its mission of diversifying programming
sources and diminishing network power. Critics argued that, quite
to the contrary, PTAR I augmented such power. °2 The FCC ap-
peared concerned that, subsequent to the promulgation of PTAR I,
the number of independent program suppliers decreased from fifty-
98. Id. at 477. The court supported this position by citing the time-honored notion that
the limited character of the electromagnetic spectrum prevents access to it by all parties and,
accordingly, imposes a duty on the FCC to regulate those parties granted access. See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969).
99. 442 F.2d at 479-81.
100. Id. at 488 (quoting California Citizen Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 48
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967)). Subsequent to Mt. Mansfield, the FCC estab-
lished the effective dates of implementation for the financial interest and syndication rules:
June 1, (syndication) and August 1, 1972 (financial interest). Competition and Responsi-
bility in Network Television Broadcasting, Opinion and Order, 35 F.C.C.2d 411 (1972).
101. Prime-Time Access Rule, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 37 F.C.C. 2d 900 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Rulemaking].
102. Id. at 909-11. The allegation stems from a complaint filed by MCA-Universal, Inc.,
a major program supplier. Industry concerns were reflected in a Time magazine article which
stated:
In the 16 months that the regulation has been in effect, it has been an almost perfect
boomerang. Instead of promoting original programming, it has sent the local station
managers scurrying to producers who imitate hits of the past. Instead of promoting TV
production around the country, it has been a boon to Canadian and British producers
who can usually deliver programs for much less than their American counter-
parts. . . .Most of the syndicated entertainment shows that have filled the tube have
been produced on low budgets, $10,000 to $60,000 per half-hour versus $100,000 for an
average network show of the same length. Cheap game shows have proliferated, and
shows that the networks once discarded, such as The Lawrence Welk Show and Hee-
Haw, have been resuscitated.
TIME, June 2, 1972, at 55. Much of the controversy is thoughtfully evaluated in Note, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 902 (1976).
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four in 1970 to forty-three in 1972.113 "Major" independent produ-
cers, it was claimed, had suffered injury by being foreclosed from
access to a substantial segment of prime-time, as they customarily
relied on the "network process for obtaining exposure for their qual-
ity product."' 1 Additionally, it has been alleged that the creation
of the access hour had caused tangible financial losses among the
motion picture studios.0 5 After extensive consideration, the FCC
promulgated a new prime-time access rule.' This new rule, PTAR
II, reduced access time to one half-hour between Monday and Sat-
urday in the 7:30 P.M. to 8:00 P.M. time-slot and permitted the use
of one access time-slot per week to be used for the presentation of
network or "off-network" programming concerned with public af-
fairs or children's issues.0 7 The new rule was challenged in National
Association of Independent Television Producers v. FCC. 0 Al-
though the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not address
the merits of the case, it remanded the decision to the FCC, citing
the Commission's proposed date for the new rule as too abrupt to
allow independent producers the opportunity to avoid economic
harm, while also failing to provide the networks with adequate time
to make programming changes. 09
On January 16, 1975, the Commission promulgated yet another
version of the Prime-Time Access Rule, PTAR llI."° Implemented
in September 1975, PTAR I essentially heralded a return to PTAR
I."I The new rule provided for one hour of access time."2 It differed
from PTAR I in that it permitted network infringement of access
time through the presentation of network or "off-network" program-
103. See Prime-Time Access Rule, Report and Order, 44 F.C.C.2d 1081, 1101 (1974).
[hereinafter cited as PTAR II].
104. Id. at 1101-02.
105. Id. Claimants asserted that $60,000,000 had been lost through the implementation
of the access hour. Id.
106. Id. at 1081.
107. Id. at 1149-50.
108. 502 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1974).
109. Id.. at 253-55. The court enjoined the Commission from implementing the rules at
any time prior to September, 1975. Id.
110. Prime-Time Access Rule, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 829 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as PTAR III].
111. Id. at 829.
112. Id. The Commission later stated: "We do not find persuasive the argument that
modification of the rule increases network dominance and returns time to the monopoly
whose excesses led to the rule." Id. at 846.
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ming devoted to children's shows or public affairs."3 The financial
interest and syndication rules were left intact. PTAR III was subse-
quently upheld in National Association of Independent Television
Producers v. F. C. C. (II). "' This rule is currently in effect.
The effectiveness of PTAR III has been the subject of considerable
analysis."5 As intended, the rule has fostered the development of
independent syndication programs. At the same time, however, the
rule has operated to consolidate the oligopsonistic power of the net-
works. PTAR III effectively precludes the networks' "brokerage"
function" 6 in the "access" period by supplanting their centralized
purchasing position with an expanded, decentralized market com-
posed of individual affiliate stations."7 The result has been the ex-
pansion of entry by syndicators into prime-time,"8 without a dis-
cernible decrease in the quality of program offerings."' This may be
partially attributable to affiliate station managers' interest in pro-
curing programming that would, lure an audience of sufficient size
into watching the evening network schedule of programs. As the
Commission anticipated, industry economies have permitted syndi-
cators as well as station managers to reap the profits from the exhi-
bition of syndicated programming.'20 It appears, however, that the
113. Id. at 830.
114. 516 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1975). The opinion is worth perusing for its recapitulation of
the controversy over PTAR I and PTAR II.
115. See generally note 10 supra.
116. See OWEN, supra note 14, at 7.
117. See NOLL & PECK, supra note 14, at 85-86.
118. This fact alone vitiated the Commission's reasoning that the economics of access-
time syndication permitted the relatively unencumbered entry of new suppliers. See Network
Broadcasting, supra note 8, at 396.
119. "Quality" of course is in the eye of the consumer.
120. Lexington Broadcasting, Inc.'s "Sha Na Na" and ITC, Inc.'s "The Muppet Show"
are examples of current, successful access-time programming. In 1978, an episode of "The
Muppet Show" cost approximately $140,000 to produce; the series was purchased for $200,000
per episode. See Why TV Syndicators are Striking It Rich, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 28, 1977, at
78.
Similarly, station profits have soared. In 1975, television stations earned $571.8 million in
pre-tax profits; in 1976, these revenues soared in excess of 20%. Id. The reason for the
syndicator-station manager entente is elementary: it makes economic sense to purchase pro-
grams from a syndicator-even at a higher price-and air it instead of a network-originated
program. The station can sell commercial time in the program to local and national advertis-
ers and reap up to 10 or 15 times the rates it is paid' y the network for carrying one of its
programs. BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 28, 1977, at 78-79 (Interview with Lou Friedland, President
MCA-TV). For a dissenting perspective on syndication economics see Schuessler, supra note
10, at 289-91.
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major effect of the rules has been to make local affiliates more like
the networks without fostering localized, individualized program-
ming.' In addition, the rules have operated to strengthen network
control by concentrating their "program brokerage" function within
a smaller time-slot.' This results from two factors. First, the
Prime-Time Access Rule reduces the prime-time available to inde-
pendent suppliers, thus enhancing network control over program
procurement. 2 Second, the contraction of network prime-time has
tended to escalate advertising rates as advertisers compete for re-
duced national network time, thus permitting networks to reap
ever-increasing profits.'
It merits note that since the inception of the Program Procure-
ment Rules, the FCC has made additional strides towards restrict-
ing network power through collateral methods such as the selective
deregulation of cable television systems and the promotion of alter-
nate means of television distribution. 5 These issues will be dis-
cussed after a consideration of the Justice Department's response to
the rules and the network power the suits seek to curb.
IV. The Current Antitrust Litigation
A. History
The pending antitrust actions are the product of an inquiry
started over two decades ago.' This inquiry was originally stayed
121. See Crandall, supra note 10, at 407. Station managers, after all, are beset by the same
set of considerations (e.g., mass appeal) confronting a network programmer. Id.
122. Id. at 408. See also Note, 29 RUroGEea L. REv. 902, 913 (1976).
123. See Note, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 902, 913-14 (1976).
124. Id. In the first year following the implementation of the rules, network pre-tax
profits soared 106 percent. Id. One commentator has gone further to suggest that independent
producers are disadvantaged by the financial interest and syndication rules inasmuch as they
"prohibit producers from selling their syndication risks to the networks while prolonging the
delay between incurrence of production costs and receipt of syndication revenues, thereby
increasing any existing production deficits." Schuessler, supra note 10, at 305. Although this
may hold true in a majority of cases, established producers with a proven record of profitabil-
ity are all too eager to accept the risks attendant on self-syndication in anticipation of
substantially higher profits. See, e.g., Viacom International, Inc. v. Tandem Productions,
Inc., 526 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1975) (Tandem, producer of CBS' "All In The Family", "Maude"
and "The Jeffersons," sought to re-acquire syndication rights granted to Viacom, a former
CBS subsidiary engaged in syndication, prior to the implementation of the Program Procure-
ment Rules).
125. See pt. V infra.
126. See Hearings On Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries Before The Antitrust
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pending the outcome of the 1959 FCC investigation.'2 Once the
Commission's program procurement rules were fully promulgated,
the Justice Department commenced the present actions on Decem-
ber 10, 1974.12
As the suits proceeded through a protracted discovery phase, the
district court, on February 16, 1977, denied a motion to dismiss by
the networks. This motion was based on a theory of the networks'
implied immunity to the antitrust laws by virtue of the FCC's regu-
latory power.' 9 Several months later, on July 30, 1977, ABC's mo-
tion to dismiss or stay the predecessor suit was also denied.", On
November 28, 1977, after extensive negotiation, the United States
and NBC entered into a consent decree.' 3 The decree was eventu-
ally approved by the court after extensive commentary and submis-
sion of memoranda in opposition thereto. 3 On June 20, 1978, the
court entered an order compelling the United States to set forth
detailed definitions of and a more particularized recital of proposed
proofs regarding the relevant market in which the networks' oppres-
Subcommittee Of The Judiciary Committee Of The House of Representatives, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. Ser.22, pt.2 (1956).
127. See pt. III supra.
128. The litigation is in most respects identical to suits brought against the networks by
the Justice Department on April 14, 1972, and dismissed without prejudice on November 11,
1974. See 65 F.R.D. 415, 418 (C.D. Cal. 1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 940 (1975). The
original suits were characterized as coercive efforts by the Nixon administration intended to
stifle network criticism of administration policy. Their bizarre history is summarized in
Kubin, The Antitrust Imblications of Network Television Programming, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
1207, 1208-11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kubin]; see also SATURDAY R viEw, Apr. 29, 1972,
at 23; NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 29, 1972, at 9.
129. United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cases 61,327
(C.D. Cal.). In its decision, the court relied on United States v. RCA, Inc., 358 U.S. 334
(1959), a case that established the applicability of the antitrust laws to the broadcast industry
and removed any barrier to their enforcement by virtue of coextensive FCC action. On a prior
motion to dismiss or stay the original 1972 suits, the court ruled that the FCC's primary
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action did not preclude the Justice Department
from filing suit. See 1974-1 Trade Cases 74,885 (C.D. Cal). The court did not address the
immunity issue, because of the defendant networks' disclaimer that implied immunity from
the antitrust laws was barred by extant case law. Id.
130. 1977-2 Trade Cases 61,580. The motion for reconsideration was prompted by a
declaration of intent by the FCC to conduct an inquiry into the network practices presently
being litigated. See Notice of Inquiry, Commercial Television Network Practices, 23 F.C.C.2d
548 (1977).
131. See 1978-1 Trade Cases 61,855. The settlement was submitted on Nov. 17, 1976.
Id.
132. See 1978-1 Trade Cases 61,842.
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sive behavior wag alleged to have occurred.'33 Subsequent to the
government's compliance, the networks moved to dismiss the alle-
gations in a motion for summary judgment."' The court dismissed
the government's allegation of monopolization in the primary net-
work market' 35 but retained the balance of the government's allega-
tions.' 3 Additionally, the court found the government's recitals of
evidence sufficiently particular to proceed with a trial upon comple-
tion of defendant's discovery.' 37 Discovery is scheduled for comple-
tion in the spring of 1980.38 Attorneys assigned to the litigation
foresee a trial commencing some time during that year.' 3'
B. The Networks' Alleged Antitrust Violations
The government's allegations charge the networks with entering
into agreements which suppress competition in violation of section
one of the Sherman Act,"' and with monopolizing or attempting to
monopolize the trade and commerce in television entertainment
programming during prime-time viewing hours in violation of sec-
tion two of the Sherman Act."' An analysis of these claims' is
necessary, both to comprehend the Justice Department's motives in
prosecuting the present actions and to grasp the altered character
of network program procurement in the aftermath of the Commis-
sion's 1970 rules.
133. 1978-2 Trade Cases 62,394.
134. Id.
135. The primary network market is the "relevant market composed of national commer-
cial television network prime-time entertainment programs." Id. at 76,380. See notes 194.200
infra.
136. 1978-2 Trade Cases 62,394 at 76,384.
137. Id. at 76,383-84. A commentator has suggested that discovery in this suit is valuable
insofar as it may make information relating to the manner in which social and political ideas
are presented (or not presented) in entertainment programming a matter of public record.
See SATURDAY REVIEW, Apr. 29, 1972, at 23.
138. Telephone interview with Eric Branfman, Esq. of Bergson, Borkland, Margolis &
Adler, counsel for defendant ABC in the present litigation (Feb. 1, 1980).
139. Telephone interview with John Kolar, Esq., Department of Justice, Antitrust Divi-
sion (Oct. 25, 1979).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
142, For a discussion of the substance of the Justice Department's claims with respect to
network acquisition of financial interests and syndication rights in programming, see pt. II
supra. These issues will not be reiterated here. Similarly, the network's alleged monopoliza-
tion of prime-time programming will be discussed only to the extent that it relates to the
networks' dealings with independent program suppliers.
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1. Sherman Act: Section One Claims
Section one of the Sherman Act renders illegal any "contracts,"
"combinations" and "conspiracies" in restraint of trade."' Since
1911, the Supreme Court has construed the Act to bar only those
restraints which are deemed "unreasonable" in light of all available
circumstances."' Accordingly, "[tihe true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and per-
haps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competiton."'" Section one additionally
requires a finding of agreement between two or more entities to
engage in anticompetitive conduct.'" Such agreement, however,
need not be express, and may be inferred by the courts from a wide
range of circumstances, including a "knowing wink" or course of
conduct.'47 The Justice Department alleges that the networks have
exercised their market power, prior and subsequent to the enact-
ment of the FCC program procurement rules, in such a way as to
coerce independent program suppliers to accept anticompetitive
provisions in network licensing agreements. Such provisions, the
Justice Department claims, are intended to augment network con-
trol over program production, exhibition and distribution. Typi-
cally, such agreements include:
(i) provisions relating to "pilot" program production"8 which pre-
clude the purchase or broadcast of the pilot by another broadcaster
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
144. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The standard enunciated in Chicago Board of Trade
has come to be recognized as the "rule of reason" test.
145. 246 U.S. at 238. The court is obliged to consider the purpose and the effect of the
restraint. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 500 (1969).
There are, of course, "certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasona-
ble and . . . therefore illegal. . . ." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
Such agreements include tie-in arrangements, agreements to divide markets, price-fixing
arrangements, and group boycotts. Id. The government's complaint does not allege the perpe-
tration of any such offense by the networks.
146. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962).
147. Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1965). This is precisely the
government's theory in the suit against the networks. See Memorandum of the United States
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Sherman Act Claims at
4-5, United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., Civ. No. 74-3600 (C.D. Cal., filed
Dec. 10, 1974). [hereinafter cited as U.S. Memorandum].
148. See note 32 supra.
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for an extended period, even where the original convenanting net-
work has no intention of utilizing the pilot;'49
(ii) provisions relating to program series which contain extensive
annual renewal options at preestablished escalation rates. Tradi-
tionally, these options extend for a minimum period of five years,
in addition to the pilot stage.' 0 As very few network series run for
periods longer than five years, the options serve to shield the original
covenanting network from competitive bids by other broadcasters
for the exhibition rights;'
5
'
(iii) provisions relating to the networks' acquisition of a right of
first refusal or first negotiation for renewal of the program series'
term of broadcast. Such provisions are said to effectively inhibit
bargaining for broadcast rights to the series, even after the annual
renewal options have expired; 5 2
(iv) provisions which preclude the exploitation of prime-time tele-
vision programs on any other communications media' 3 or market
during the term of the original network run;'54
149. See Plaintiff's Attachment 2 To Identification Of The Evidence In Support Of The
Government's Contention That CBS and ABC Have Violated Sections 1 And 2 Of The
Sherman Act at 16, United States v. American Broadcasting Co., Civ. No. 74-3600 (C.D. Cal.,
filed Dec. 10, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Attachment 2].
150. Id. at 18.
151. Id. The government, citing the repeated failure of major independent producers to
receive more favorable terms, alleges that each defendant has utilized its market power to
exact the options. Id. at 19.
According to Richard Zimbert, a high-ranking ABC official, the network recognized that
where it was required to renegotiate a contract after the expiration of the five-year term, it
would not be able to limit the producer to the five percent escalation fee for annual renewals.
Id. at 20. Universal City Studio's bettering of renewal terms for the "Emergency" and "Bionic
Woman" series, subsequent to the expiration of network renewal options, is cited in support
thereof. Id.
152. Id. at 22. Independent producers have indicated that it is difficult to sell a series
against a first refusal clause, because every shift in negotiating posture with another party,
no matter how trivial, dictates the resubmission of an offer to reacquire the series to the
original covenanting network. Id. at 23.
153. These include: syndication, pay television, CATV, cassettes and motion picture
exhibition. Id. at 23. See pt. V infra.
154. The exclusivity provisions were found in 100 percent of the network agreements
examined by the government. Attachment 2, supra note 149, at 23(a). There is testimony to
support the Justice Department's contention that the networks may have obtained such
exclusivity in order to restrain pay television's development as a theatrical film exhibition
medium. Id. This result is said to have been accomplished by shortening the period of time
that feature films are available for exhibition, and by denying pay television the opportunity
to exhibit certain films at all. Id. at 23(d). See also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d
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(v) provisions which prevent "spinoff"'5 5 series from being ac-
quired by any party other than the original covenanting network;'"6
(vi) provisions which bar the syndication of independently pro-
duced programs by any other broadcaster during the period of the
original network run; '"
(vii) provisions which permit little or no adjustment in the produ-
cer's fee to reflect the success of his program on the network., ' In
effect, the networks' demand for long-term options "lock-in" an
independent producer and his product at pre-set rates. Thus, a
closed market is created.'59
Intrinsic to the bargaining process, but seldom memorialized, is
the networks' alleged practice of requiring independent suppliers to
utilize network-owned production facilities as a condition for licens-
ing their programs.6 0 Apart from network licensing agreements, a
particularly disturbing development for many independents has
been the proliferation of the "talent hold" agreement, whereby a
network contracts with creative talent for protracted periods of net-
9, 40-43 (1977) The networks' need for exclusivity, it is claimed, is all the more puzzling in
light of pay-television's relatively small audience and unintentional ability to enhance the
appeal of network-exhibited programs. Attachment 2, supra note 149, at 23(i). In comments
submitted before the FCC, ABC submitted no evidence to support its contention that con-
tractual exclusivity is necessary to protect the value of its theatrical film licenses. Id. See
Comments of American Broadcasting Company, Inc., in FCC Docket No. 20402, Sept. 26,
1975, at 32. In fact, it has been asserted that pay-television exhibition may actually boost
the popularity of network-exhibited programming through advance word-of-mouth publicity
and through the "spill-over" effect of pay-television exhibitor's advertisements in other
media. Attachment 2, supra note 149, at 23(j).
155. A "spinoff" may be regarded as new and different program suggested by the original
licensed program. Attachment 2, supra note 149, at 24.
156. ABC agreements customarily prevent the use of continuing characters (a character
appearing in more than 3-7 episodes) in spinoffs other than those acquired by ABC. Id. at
25. The network's insistence on a one-year, non-negotiable period during which the network
has exclusive rights to the spinoff is said to effectively foreclose other networks or broadcasters
from bidding for the program. Id. at 24.
157. See Attachment 2, supra note 149, at 26. There is evidence to suggest that syndica-
tion would not affect the prime-time ratings of the original network program even if it were
broadcast on another network. Id. at 26-27.
158. Id. ABC licensing agreements customarily limit license fee escalations to five percent
or less in each year after the first. Id. Similarly, producers are customarily not afforded the
right to share in the networks' gross or net income. Id.
159. Id. at 29.
160. Attachment 2, supra note 149, at 34. This practice was found to occur even in those
cases where non-network production facilities were seen as considerably less expensive. Id.
at 34-5.
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work exclusivity."' These agreements are said to place independents
at a competitive disadvantage, inasmuch as they are not in a posi-
tion to guarantee network exposure to creative talent. Their disad-
vantage is compounded by the networks' alleged practice of coercing
independent suppliers to accept network contract players even
though such contracts may contain prohibitive financial terms that
producers are obliged to bear.' By compelling their acceptance,
networks are free to reap the benefits of artist exclusivity while
simultaneously minimizing its cost.' 3
The Justice Department concludes its charges by alleging that
network control of affiliate station groups, effected through network
demand for high affiliate clearance rates,' has effectively fore-
closed the market for prime-time syndicated programming outside
of the access period.' 5 This control, when coupled with parallel price
setting behavior' among the networks and the networks' ability to
preempt independently produced programming' 7 on their schedules
by self-producing through their internal facilities and motion pic-
ture producing subsidiaries, 8 has left independent suppliers with
161. See id. at 48. As of August 22, 1975, ABC had one or two individuals under such
contracts; by 1977 the number had risen to 39. Id.
162. Id. The "talent hold" agreements also prevent producers from negotiating deals with
rival networks for the exhibition of television programs whose original exclusivity may have
lapsed because a performer who is vital to the program's identification is still under contract
to the original network. Id. In a well-publicized dispute, Universal Television's bargaining
position in transferring the "Bionic Woman" series from ABC to NBC was impaired when
ABC asserted its right to retain the "Oscar Goldman" character, common to both the "Bionic
Woman" and "Six Million Dollar Man" series. Id. at 52.
163. Id. at 52(C)-(E).
164. "Clearance Rate" is a measure of the number of programs which an affiliated station
accepts for broadcast from its network. Attachment 2, supra note 149, at 31. Clearance rates
for ABC affiliates, for example, fluctuated from 94% to 97% in the period 1965-1971. Id. at
32.
165. Id. As stated previously, the networks' high clearance rate demands were accompa-
nied by a gradual contraction in the number of buyers of prime-time programming from fifty
or so during the 1950's to the three networks today. See notes 56-60 supra and accompanying
text.
166. See Attachment 2, supra note 149, at 58-68. Note that, of itself, conscious parallelism
is not unlawful, nor does it conclusively establish agreement. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954).
167. See Attachment 2, supra note 149, at 44.
168. ABC owned ABC Circle Films, Inc., while competitor CBS established Cinema Cen-
ter Films, Inc. See Attachment 2, supra note 149, at 45. In seeming indifference to the pending
litigation, ABC has recently announced its intention to resume production of theatrical fea-
ture films after nearly a decade of inactivity. See N.Y. Times, July 13, 1979, at C12, col.3.
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no alternative other than compliance with the networks' allegedly
oppressive program procurement practices.
The networks counter these arguments in the following ways:'"1
(i) The networks assert that the acquisition of entertainment pro-
gramming involves the assumption of considerable entrepreneurial
risk due to the considerable expense and uncertainty associated
with program production. 0 In exchange for assuming the risk, the
network acquires not the fee simple to a discrete piece of property
but rather an intricate bundle of rights which it must exploit in
order to recoup its investment.'
(ii) The networks assert that control of programming, whether
effected by the acquisition of financial interests, restrictive contrac-
tual provisions, or otherwise, has not suppressed competition among
program suppliers.' Even if such strategies were to result in a sup-
pression of competition, it would be inherently incredible for the
networks to adopt such a course inasmuch as competition tends to
result in lower prices, higher quality and increased supply. 73
CBS has likewise signalled its intention to return to the motion picture production arena. See
Variety, Oct. 10, 1979, at 1, col.2.
169. See Defendant's Notice of Memorandum In Support of Its Motion For Summary
Judgment On The Sherman Act Claims, United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., Civ. No. 74-3599 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 10, 1974) [hereinafter cited as CBS Memoran-
dum]. See also Comments of CBS on the Proposed Decree in United States v. National
Broadcasting Company, United States v. NBC, Civ. No. 74-3601 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 10,
1974) [hereinafter cited as CBS Comments].
170. See notes 24-37 supra. The networks allege that the relief sought by the Justice
Department is anticompetitive insofar as it will operate to concentrate production in large
firms (i.e., the major motion picture studios) who are best able to assume the financial risks
formerly shouldered by the networks. See CBS Comments, supra note 169, at 14-15. The
networks additionally allege that the relief sought will foster entry barriers to those indepen-
dent program suppliers that are unable or unwilling to assume the risks attendant on televi-
sion production. Id. at 14A-17A (affidavit of Franklin M. Fisher). Alternatively, "smaller"
independent producers may attempt to limit their risks by selling such risks to firms already
involved in the business of acquiring these risks (i.e., the major motion picture studios). Id.
171. CBS Memorandum, supra note 169, at 25-26. The network's counteroffensive pre-
saged the pro-network analysis of the government's claims offered in Fastow, Competition,
Competitors and the Government's Suit Against the Networks, 22 AN'MusT Buu.. 517 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Fastow].
172. CBS Memorandum, supra note 169, at 27. Universal and Paramount Television's
sale of programming to ABC, CBS, and NBC during the 1975-76 television broadcast season
is offered as a persuasive example of this competition. Id. See also OWEN, supra note 14, at
28-31.
173. CBS Memorandum, supra note 169, at 27; see also Fastow, supra note 171, at 529.
The networks allege that, although the proposed relief may result in a redistribution of
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(iii) The networks' requests for identification by the Justice De-
partment of contractual provisions it found unlawful produced no
definite identification.' Thus, the networks reason, if "none of the
contracts is in itself unlawful, then there is no unlawful contract
and, hence, no Section 1 violation. . . [A] section one claim
cannot be sustained by reference to a 'course of conduct' where all
of the agreements involved are themselves concededly innocent."'75
In opposing the CBS motion for summary judgment, 7 ' the Justice
Department addressed several of the foregoing assertions, intending
solely to establish the presence of triable issues of fact. In so re-
sponding, plaintiff avoided confronting the substantive merits of
defendant's answers. Notwithstanding, it is hoped that the follow-
ing comments may shed some light on defendant's assertions.
In the absence of supporting evidence, it appears specious for the
networks to suggest that restrictive provisions in network-supplier
dealings are necessary to limit network production risks.'77 At best,
income from NBC to certain suppliers, such a redistribution neither serves to increase compe-
tition nor further the public interest in promoting economically efficient organization. CBS
Comments, supra note 169, at 5A (affidavit of Franklin M. Fisher). It is further alleged that,
the proposed reduction in the production of internally-generated programming by the net-
works will alter the supply of programs without altering the demand (i.e., the networks will
still require three hours of prime-time programming each weeknight), thus resulting in a
reduction of competition. CBS Comments, supra note 169, at 72A (affidavit of Richard
Posner).
174. CBS Memorandum, supra note 169, at 29-30.
175. Id. at 31. Defendant notes that the cases cited by plaintiff in support of its "course
of conduct" theory, American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S 781 (1945), United
States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 (1913), and Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905),
involved identifiable agreements that constitute per se violations of section one. Id. Other
arguments posed by the networks are of lesser significance. See CBS Memorandum, supra
note 169, at 31-35. Curiously, the network's seeming noncommital strategies failed to advance
a final argument posed by Fastow: namely that the networks' restrictive contractual provi-
sions are necessary to avoid a possible monopoly bottleneck caused by a supplier graced with
a "hit" show. Fastow, supra note 171, at 529-30.
176. See U.S. Memorandum, supra note 147.
177. To date such evidence has not been forthcoming. See generally CBS Memorandum,
supra note 169, at 25-35. Fastow's analysis likewise fails to substantiate this basic assump-
tion. See Fastow, supra note 171, at 525-29. If one may analogize the networks' insistence on
restrictive provisions in their bargaining with suppliers to the networks' pre-1970 acquisition
of financial and syndication rights in network-broadcast programs, then one would have
expected initial payments to independent producers to decrease as the networks would have
sought to limit their risk by lowering the intitial cash outlay for a program series. This did
not occur. See NOLL & PECK, supra note 14, at 83-84. See also A. REEL, THE NETWORKs: How
THEY STOLE THE SHow 132 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REEL].
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these provisions are reasonable approximations of what unrestricted
negotiation would produce net of its higher transaction costs; 178 at
worst, they operate to subvert market forces to the disadvantage of
independent suppliers. 7 ' Although easing such restrictive provisions
may serve to reduce network profitability, the failure to do so may
jeopardize the survival of program suppliers.'
The second issue raised by defendants is more complex in nature.
It is true, as the networks assert, that it is in an oligopsonist's
interest to promote efficiency among suppliers in order to profit
from increased output and lowered pricing,'' and that, accordingly,
it would be counterproductive for them to suppress competition
among suppliers.'82 Although this appears to hold true at the initial
stage of acquisition, where suppliers' products are reasonably fungi-
ble, once an individual program achieves substantial popular ac-
claim it attains the status of a unique commodity and, therefore, it
is to the networks' advantage to appropriate the "downstream" ac-
tivities of the program in order to suppress later competition be-
tween itself and rival networks for the product.8 3 In so acting, it is
alleged that the networks have imposed severe hardships on inde-
pendent suppliers at a time when network profits are soaring.'84
The response to the networks' third contention is more forth-
right.8 5 Failure to indicate specifically unlawful provisions in
network-supplier agreements does not, of itself, preclude a finding
178. See NOLL & PECK, supra note 14, at 63-64.
179. At minimum, network payments to independent suppliers must equal the amount
received by the supplier were he to deal directly with each of the network's affiliates for the
acquisition of programming, less the transaction and distribution costs inherent in such a
venture. See NOLL & PECK, supra note 14, at 63, 304-05; OWEN, supra note 14, at 37-38.
Conversely, the upper limit of payments to independent suppliers is limited by the attractive-
ness of non-network (e.g., syndication) alternatives. NOLL & PECK, supra note 14, at 63.
Within these parameters, the competitive market, not the networks, should be permitted to
dictate the price payable to program producers.
180. See U.S. Memorandum, supra note 147, at 10-11.
181. See Fastow, supra note 171, at 529.
182. CBS Memorandum, supra note 169, at 27. The government responded by positing
that defendant's assertion belies the inferences raised by their course of conduct. U.S. Memo-
randum, supra note 147, at 8. The government also suggests that the networks profit from
suppression of competition among suppliers due to their internal production capabilities and
prerogative to preempt all available network time. Id.
183. See 1978-2 Trade Cases 62,394 at 76, 382-83.
184. U.S. Memorandum, supra note 147, at 10.
185. Id. at 9 n.6.
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of a section one violation.' It has been held that "[elven an other-
wise lawful device may be used as a weapon in restraint of trade or
in an effort to monopolize a part of trade or commerce."'8 7 Thus, it
is necessary to examine *all network-imposed restraints in order to
determine if their combined effect is the suppression of competi-
tion. "'88
2. Sherman Act: Section Two Claims
Section two of the Sherman Act' condemns "[elvery person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire . . . to monopolize.""' The offense of monopolization, as
presently construed by the courts, necessitates a showing of monop-
oly power in the relevant market,"' in addition to the intentional
acquisition or maintenance of such monopoly power, as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident. 2 Accordingly, any
monopolization analysis must commence with a definition of the
relevant market in which oppressive firm behavior is said to occur." 3
The present posture of the case, as delimited by the granting of
partial summary judgment,"' charges the networks with using the
monopoly power of their affiliate stations"" to restrain competition
among program suppliers in a submarket composed of each net-
works' prime-time entertainment programs."' The court's recogni-
186. Id.
187. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 119 (1948). See also
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
188. U.S. Memorandum, supra note 147, at 9 n.6.
189. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
190. Id.
191. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
192. Id. See also Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264,
1270 (9th Cir. 1975).
193. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965).
194. See generally United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 1978-2 Trade
Cases $ 62,394 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
195. Specifically, the government alleges that each network has, "strung together a na-
tionwide chain of government-granted monopolies in the form of television stations-much
like a pool of patents or a package of copyrighted works," to exert its monopoly abuses. U.S.
Memorandum, supra note 147, at 12-13.
196. 1978-2 Trade Cases 62,394 at 76,379. In so holding, Judge Kelleher approvingly
cited a series of decisions affirming defendant's ability to monopolize a submarket consisting
solely of its own products. See Greyhound Computer Corp. v. International Business Mach.,
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tion of the existence of such submarkets obviates the need for as-
sessing each defendant's monopoly power in the relevant submarket
because, by definition, each defendant controls one hundred percent
of each submarket.117 Second, the networks will no longer be able to
argue that their monopoly power was "thrust upon" them by the
mere act of going into business9 ' because, although their control of
the initial program production market may be a function of their
government-granted monopoly power, their control of the submar-
ket, consisting of each network's prime-time entertainment pro-
gramming, is intentionally affected through the contractual re-
straints discussed previously.'
A summary of the government's submarket monopoly theory is
offered by Judge Kelleher:
The close interdependence alleged by the government between ABC, CBS
and NBC in their purchasing policies means that, although the networks
compete, to some extent in the primary market, the terms and conditions of
their purchasing contracts are strikingly similar. All contracts control and
.appropriate the "downstream" activities of a unique prime-time entertain-
ment idea. Further, contracts with producers bind them, in the future, with
respect to new ideas. Thus, though there may be competition, to some extent,
in the primary market at time One, the contracts and the market power of
the networks create the very submarket the government complains of at
times Two or Three (e.g. network control of spinoffs, foreign distribution,
etc.)."'
Inc., 559 F.2d. 488, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); see also Bushie
v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972). This market definition, however, is in sharp
coptrast to a majority of courts that have rejected a definition of the market as limited to
defendant's own products and services. See Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 914-25
(10th Cir. 1975); see also B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL
ANTrrRusT: A COMPARATIvE GUIDE 695 n.61, 697 n.64 (1979) and sources cited therein. Plaintiff
originally alleged monopolization by each defendant of the market composed of all national
network prime-time programming. 1978-2 Trade Cases 62,395 at 76,379. The allegation was
summarily dismissed. Id. at 76,384-5. In its decision, the court relied on Judge Learned
Hand's dictum that while a ninety percent share of a market is sufficient to constitute a
monopoly, "it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly
thirty-three percent is not." United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d
Cir. 1945), and, accordingly, found each network's seemingly invariable one-third share of the
prime-time evening schedule insufficient to constitute a monopoly as a matter of law. 1978-2
Trade Cases 62,395 at 76,378-81.
197. The networks readily acknowledge this. CBS Memorandum, supra note 169, at 5.
198. The networks cited Trixler Brokerage Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 505 F.2d 1045, 1051
(9th Cir. 1974), and Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80, 85 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1093 (1973), in support of their position. CBS Memorandum, supra note 169, at 5.
199. See notes 148-63 supra and accompanying text.
200. 1978-2 Trade Cases T 62,394, at 76,382.
1980]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
The issue is certainly a complex one in which defendants' guilt
or innocence will likely be determined by a reasoned appraisal of the
fairness of the contractual restraints discussed in the preceding sec-
tion. 20'
As the cases near resolution, either through settlement 2 or litiga-
tion, FCC proceedings regarding network program procurement
have been recently reinstated. The impact of such parallel govern-
ment enforcement proceedings will be discussed in the next section.
V. Renewed FCC Inquiry into the Program Procurement
Process and Developing Trends in Alternative Television
Media
On January 14, 1977, the FCC instituted notice of its renewed
inquiry into the alleged dominance of the broadcast industry by the
television networks."' Although the Commission's interest was ini-
tially prodded by a petition for rulemaking submitted by Westing-
house Broadcasting, Inc.,2"' further reason for such a reexamination
would undoubtedly have been provided by the terms of the NBC
consent settlement, 05 as well as the Justice Department's apparent
assumption of FCC regulatory responsibility. 201 The FCC has ex-
pressed its intention not to foreclose the pending government ac-
tions.207 Nevertheless, implementation of different regulatory
201. See generally HILIS, ANTITRUST ADVISOR 65, 66 (1971). If found innocent of monopoli-
zation, defendant may still be found guilty of attempted monopolization. The requisite ele-
ments of the offense were recently stated to comprise of, "first, a specific intent to control
prices or destroy competition with respect to a part of commerce; second, predatory conduct
directed toward accomplishing the unlawful purpose; and, third, a dangerous probability of
success." William Inglis & Sons v. ITT Continental Baking, 461 F. Supp. 410, 416-17 (N.D.
Cal. 1978).
202. To many, a settlement appears to be a reasonable course insofar as such a settlement
would likely be modelled after the NBC Consent Decree-a less than demanding document
vilified by a host of independent suppliers. See United States v. National Broadcasting Co.,
449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
203. Commercial Television Network Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 62 F.C.C.2d. 548
(1977), [hereinafter cited as Network Inquiry].
204. Id. at 549. The petition called for a "comprehensive inquiry and rulemaking proceed-
ing to review the changing role and function of the three national television networks." Id.
205. See note 202 supra.
206. The Justice Department filed comments in support of the Westinghouse petition
while subtly cautioning the FCC against an inquiry into "those issues now being litigated in
the Federal District Court in California." Letter from Honorable Donald I. Baker, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division to the FCC, at 1-2 (Dec. 3, 1976) cited in Network
Inquiry, supra note 203, at 549.
207. Id.
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schemes could lead to confusion; additionally, the renewed FCC
inquiry could have a discernible impact on any proposed remedies
in the current antitrust litigation.'" 8
Principally due to financial difficulties, the FCC investigation
was temporarily halted on June 30, 1977.09 After nearly one year,
the inquiry was reactivated and a special investigative staff ap-
pointed to collect and analyze relevant data. 10 On October 19, 1978,
the Commission stated its preliminary narrowing of the specific
network practices to be addressed by the inquiry; in substance,
these practices conform substantially to the pattern of alleged mon-
opolistic abuses challenged by the Justice Department as discussed
previously.2t' Since that time, the Commission has denied a motion
by the Motion Picture Association of America to issue a declaratory
judgment regarding the legality of several of the alleged offenses
prosecuted in the antitrust actions as violative of the FCC's finan-
cial interest rule."' In declining to decide the issue, the Commission
emphasized its concern for a thorough economic analysis of the
program procurement process and its desire not to intrude on the
pending actions. Of greater relevance to this discussion, the Com-
mission expressed its intent to focus its inquiry on network program
procurement practices within the expanding context of broadcast
industry structures and innovations in technology."'
Soon after the conclusion of the FCC's first investigation into
208. This concern was first voiced in petitions submitted by ABC and CBS against the
NBC Consent Decree. See United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127,
1139 (C.D. Cal. 1978). Although Judge Kelleher recognized a "real and substantial" problem-
in differing regulatory approaches, he stated that the FCC inquiry should not deter the court
from ordering appropriate relief. Id. Moreover, the court appeared to suggest that, should the
FCC formulate its regulatory scheme subsequent to the implementation of a final judicial
order, such scheme would likely be compelled to defer to "in place" antitrust relief. Id.
Whether the converse would apply was not expressly addressed although such was suggested
by the Supreme Court's holding in California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 490
(1962).
209. See Commercial Television Network Practices, Order, 67 F.C.C.2d 136 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as TV Network Practices].
210. 43 Fed. Reg. 36444 (1978).
211. See generally Commercial Television Network Practices, Notice of Further Inquiry,
69 F.C.C.2d 1524 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Notice of Inquiry (II)].
212. See In the Matter of MPPAA Petition Concerning Commercial Television Network
Practices, Opinion and Order, 70 F.C.C.2d 1443 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MPPAA Peti-
tion]. The financial interest rule is codified in 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(i)-(ii) (1976).
213. See MPPAA Petition, supra note 212, at 1447.
214. See Notice of Inquiry (II), supra note 211, at 1529-31.
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network program procurement, questions were raised as to the eco-
nomic efficiency of the Commission's rulemaking.2 t 5 The procure-
ment rules, it was argued, augmented rather than diminished the
oligopsony power of the networks by concentrating their program-
brokerage function"' in a smaller time-frame. The correct method
to dissipate network power, it was suggested, was not to tamper with
the internal economics of the networks, but to alter the fundamental
structure of broadcasting itself through the promotion of alternative
program supply sources and distribution systems."1 7 Although alter-
nate distribution systems were operational at the time the FCC
promulgated its procurement rules, the development and possible
impact of alternate systems as commercially viable distribution
modes had yet to be tested.
For example, since its inception in 1948, the cable television me-
dium (CATV) 11 has exhibited a pattern of gradual expansion into
largely urbanized areas.' As CATV matured into a viable segment
of the communications industry, it began to pose competitive chal-
lenges to the entrenched networking structure. The FCC sought to
215. See Crandall, supra note 10, at 394; Long, Antitrust and the Television Networks:
Restructuring Via Cable TV, 6 ATmIraUsr L. & ECON. REv. 99,107-08 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Long].
216. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
217. See Long, supra note 215, at 107-08. The alternative distribution systems referred to
herein may be loosely defined as consisting of cable television systems (CATV), satellite
broadcast systems and home video recorders. Other developments to be considered by the
FCC are discussed in Notice of Inquiry (II), supra note 211, at 1529-30, and will not be
discussed here. An excellent overview of the impending communications revolution's impact
on a networker (NBC) is offered in Smith, Television Enters the 80's, N. Y. Times, Aug. 19,
1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 16 [hereinafter cited as Smith].
218. Broadly speaking, a cable television system is "a system of coaxial cable and asso-
ciated electronic equipment operating from a central receiving point or tower by which televi-
sion and radio broadcast signals are received directly off the air or by other indirect means
for delivery for a fee to subscriber's premises." Cole, A Cable TV System: Its Function and
Operatio'n, 94 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CATV, TV AND PAY
TELEVISION 13 (1978). The significance of CATV in this context is its ability to carry an
unlimited set of broadcast signals in contrast to the limited character of the over-the-air
broadcast spectrum.
219. The growth of cable television has been far from explosive. See generally MAcAvoy,
DEREGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION (1977). In 1959, there were 560 cable systems and 550,000
cable households; by 1969, the number had risen to 2,260 cable systems and 3.6 million cable
households. See D. LEDUc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC (1973). Today, it is estimated
that there are in excess of seven and one-half million cable household subscribers largely
concentrated in the highly urbanized "top 50" broadcast markets. See 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 663-
64 (1979).
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define the scope of its authority"2 ' to regulate CATV through a series
of seemingly unrelated regulatory attempts, all of which met with
varying degrees of acceptance. 2 ' Despite this piecemeal approach,
FCC rulemaking in the CATV arena is apparently prompted by a
notion that the public interest is best served by pro-competitive
strategies.222
A similar approach has broadened the accessibility of domestic
satellite transmission systems. Satellites have become an integrated
segment of the television industry.223 Although formidable dish-like
antennae were formerly required to receive satellite signals, revolu-
tionary advances in electronics technology have enabled smaller,
relatively inexpensive antennae to be utilized in conjunction with
CATV systems. 4 Current estimates foresee eventual introduction
of "earth station" ownership into the consumer market.
A related development'is the mass acceptance of home video re-
cording systems (VTR's) .225 Although prospects for the VTR market
are clouded by litigation, 2  inconsistent technical standards, and
initial consumer resistance,227 experts anticipate ten million VTR's
220. The Supreme Court has construed the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 152
1962 as authorizing the regulation of CATV by the FCC as an exercise of its ancillary jurisdic-
tion over broadcast material. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S 157, 173-
76 (1968); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S.-649, 667-68 (1972). See also Cable
Television, Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
221. A comprehensivd appraisal of the efficacy of FCC regulation is offered in D. LEDuc,
CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC (1973). See also Inquiry Into The Economic Relationship
Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979).
222. Id. at 640-44. A glaring exception to this approach, equally premised on "public
interest" considerations, is the FCC's promulgation of the anti-siphoning rules. 47 C.F.R. §
76.225 (1975). The rules were subsequently invalidated in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567
F.2d. 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
223. See generally M. BOTEIN & S. ROBB, COMPETITION Vs. RESPONSIBILITY: THE CASE OF
THE MASS MEDIA 166-67 (1978).
224. Id. at 167. As the number of such "earth stations" multiply, their advantages will
be maximized and the cost per subscriber will decrease. The result should be increased
program services through satellite transmission. Id. See also Smith, supra note 217, at 18.
225. Smith, supra note 217, at 17-18.
226. See, e.g., Note, Betamax and Copyright: The Home Videorecording Controversy, 1
WHITTIER L. REV. 229 (1979); Comment, Betamax and Infringement of Television Copyright,
1977 DUKE L.J. 1181.
227. Initial consumer resistance was related to the high prices that accompanied the
introduction of the videocassette recorder. The impact of competition has broadened con-
sumer acceptance due to lowered pricing. See NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 1978, at 85.
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in use by 1985 and, ultimately fifty to sixty percent market penetra-
tion.2'
Assuming the continuance of present regulatory schemes, the net
impact of these developing technologies on the present network
structure is, at best, speculative. Assuming that network monopoly
power is rooted in the presently limited character of the electromag-
netic broadcast spectrum,2"' it may be inferred that the expansion
of the broadcast spectrum through the proliferation of the aforemen-
tioned technologies will operate to dissipate network power. 30 If
transactional efficiencies and profit maximization by local broad-
casters are augmented by the new technologies, the market may see
a gradual movement of affiliates away from network dependence.23
Advertising revenues are likely to suffer as a multiplicity of program
sources fragment the viewing audience, while simultaneously dis-
rupting the demographics of network scheduling.23 In relation to the
limited scope of this inquiry, it is apparent that the inequities of the
present program procurement process will be substantially lessened
by these developing communications structures. As potential pro-
gram buyers multiply, network power recedes and sellers are free to
exact terms consonant with their actual market power.
The FCC expressly recognized the transformations in network
structure promised by the new technologies when it stated:
As a result of these developments and others, it is now possible to conceive
of a broadcasting system, for example, in which television licensees would be
able to choose among programs from existing networks or new, over-the-air
networks or to engage in joint ventures directly with program suppliers. Simi-
larly, program suppliers not only may have these new bidders for their wares,
but also might sell programs for exhibition on many cable systems or non-
commercial public stations, or distribute directly to viewers via cassettes or
discs .... We do not mean to assert that any of these alternative forms of
networking is certain to develop or, if it did, would displace the existing
networks or be beneficial to the public. Rather, our point is that each of these
possibilities ought to be a subject of study by the inquiry. To evaluate fully
for the 1980's the central issue posed by the initial Notice-network domi-
228. This is a conservative estimate. See BROADCASTINO, Oct. 24, 1977, at 32.
229. See R. POSNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 546 (2d ed. 1977). See also Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-89, 394 (1968); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
230. See Long, supra note 215, at 107-08.
231. Id.
232. Id. See also Smith, supra note 217, at 66.
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nance-one cannot take as a given the exclusivity or immutability of the
present form of networking. 33
The FCC has made a preliminary assessment of the allocative and
distributive effects of lessened regulation of the new technologies
and found them compatible with its legislative mandate.
VI. Conclusion
This Comment has sought to develop a historical perspective on
regulatory approaches to anticompetitive behavior in the procure-
ment of television programming by the national networks. It is ap-
parent that the networks have shown a remarkable resiliency to
regulatory initiatives, having implemented elaborate strategies in-
tended to consolidate their control over program procurement. One
decade after the promulgation of the FCC's Program Procurement
Rules and six years after the filing of the Justice Department suits,
network overreaching in the acquisition of programming continues
unabated. This resiliency stems from regulatory inability or unwill-
ingness to alter the structural character of networking itself. The
present network structure is not immutable; it arose as a convenient
means of maximizing transactional efficiencies in the production,
distribution, and exhibition of television programming. It resulted
in the centralization of the program procurement function in the
three network corporations, bringing with it the ills attendant on
that degree of concentration.
Recent technological advances suggest that present network
structure has outlived its usefulness. It is hoped that the FCC's
intention to situate its new inquiry within the context of alternative
distribution technologies will pave the way for the dissipation of
network power and, with it, an end to abuses in the program pro-
curement process.
Mario J. Suarez
233. Notice of Inquiry (II), supra note 211, at 1530-31.
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